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Abstract
12The Swiss financial centre witnessed an important shift during the 1960s: the 
number of foreign banks and their importance in relation to the domestic 
banking sector significantly increased. Faced with this rapid development, 
Swiss bank representatives and political and monetary authorities reacted 
strongly. This paper investigates the evolution of the regulatory response 
by Swiss banking policy actors to the proliferation of foreign financial in-
stitutions. In 1969, those reactions led to the adoption of a discriminatory 
regime, setting higher entry barriers for foreign banks than for domestic 
institutions. After examining possible reasons for the attractiveness of 
Switzerland to foreign banks, this paper will analyse the concerns and fears 
of the domestic banking sector and its regulators. In this regard, it appears 
that issues such as mere competition, preservation of the international 
reputation of the Swiss banks and anti-inflationary monetary policy were 
central to the chosen regulatory regime. Moreover, this paper shows that 
foreign banks were used as scapegoats in the evolution of the Swiss system 
of banking supervision. They were more tightly regulated, yet the general 
framework remained very lax.
1 This article is based on research carried out as part of my ongoing doctoral thesis at the 
University of Lausanne under the supervision of Dr. Malik Mazbouri, dealing with banking 
supervision in Switzerland and Belgium (1935–1975).
2 thibaud.giddey@unil.ch - Université de Lausanne, Faculté des lettres, Section d’histoire, 
Bâtiment Anthropole (bureau 5151), CH-1015 Lausanne-Dorigny, Switzerland.
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Introduction
‘An uncontrolled expansion of foreign influence on our banks repre-
sents a real threat to the country.’3 Those are the words used in November 
1968 by the Swiss federal government to sum up the dangers related to the 
increasing foreign hold over the Swiss banking industry. The use of ex-
pressions such as Überfremdung or surpopulation étrangère, which can be 
partially translated to the English term: ‘excessive foreign control’, refers 
to a political leitmotif in the Swiss politics of the 1960s. It is noteworthy 
to mention from the outset that in the context of banking regulation, the 
federal government adopted the same vocabulary as used in various other 
political fields such as immigrant labour and corporate governance.4
This paper examines the setting up of special regulations for foreign 
banks in Switzerland in the 1960s. The process began at the end of the 1950s 
and led to the promulgation of the federal decree establishing the licensing 
system for foreign-controlled banks of 21 March 1969. A central thesis of 
this article is that the passing of discriminatory regulation constitutes an 
important victory for Swiss banking circles, which successfully managed to 
impose stronger requirements on threatening foreign competitors.
Most historians have neglected this episode in the history of the Swiss 
financial centre. Although a number of publications address the growing 
internationalisation of Swiss banks in the second half of the twentieth 
3 ‘Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale à l’appui d’un projet d’arrêté fédéral urgent 
instituant le régime du permis pour les banques en mains étrangères (du 13 novembre 1968)’, Feuille 
fédérale, 1968, vol. 2, no 48, p. 787.
4 On the question of immigrants: M. Cerutti, ‘La politique migratoire de la Suisse 1945–1970’, 
in: H. Mahnig (ed.), Histoire de la politique de migration, d’asile et d’intégration depuis 1948 (Zurich 
2005), pp. 89–134. On the question of corporate governance: M. Lüpold, ‘Der Ausbau der “Festung 
Schweiz”: Aktienrecht und Corporate Governance in der Schweiz, 1881–1961’, unpublished PhD 
thesis (Zurich 2010).
Thibaud Giddey
451
century,5 the available literature on the development of foreign banks in 
Switzerland and the limitations imposed on them by the authorities, is re-
markably scarce, consisting mainly of legal studies.6 Willi Loepfe’s recent 
monograph provides the only historical analysis of the topic.7 The paucity 
of the historiography stands in strong contrast to the richness of the Swiss 
public archives, which contain an insightful collection of documents. The 
central core of this article is based on primary archival sources, mainly 
the archives of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission, the archives of the 
Swiss National Bank and the archives of the Swiss Bankers Association.
This paper will proceed as follows. The first section puts the regu-
latory intervention into the context of the extraordinary growth of the 
Swiss financial sector (1945–1975), and lays out the international criticism 
levelled against the Swiss banking haven. This is followed by a section 
5 See for example: B.V. Christensen, ‘Switzerland’s Role as an International Financial Center’, 
IMF Occasional Paper, no 45 (1986), pp. 1–40; P. Braillard, La place financière suisse. Politique 
gouvernementale et compétitivité internationale (Geneva 1987); J. Tanner, ‘Der diskrete Charme 
der Gnomen: Entwicklungen und Perspektiven des Finanzplatzes Schweiz’, in: C.M. Merki (ed.), 
Europas Finanzzentren. Geschichte und Bedeutung im 20. Jahrhundert, (Frankfurt/New York 2005), 
pp. 127–47; T. Straumann, ‘Finanzplatz und Pfadabhängigkeit: Die Bundesrepublik, die Schweiz 
und die Vertreibung der Euromärkte (1955–1980)’, in : C.M. Merki (ed.), Europas Finanzzentren. 
Geschichte und Bedeutung im 20. Jahrhundert, (Frankfurt/New York 2005), pp. 245–68; C. Baumann 
and W.E. Rutsch, Swiss Banking – Wie weiter? Aufstieg und Wandel der Schweizer Finanzbranche 
(Zurich 2008).
6 E.F. Burkhalter, Die Bedeutung, das Wesen und die Struktur der von der Schweizerischen 
Nationalbank als ‘Übrige Banken’ bezeichneten Institute, (Thun 1969); (thereafter: Burkhalter, Übrige 
Banken); M. Meyer, Die Ausländischen Banken in der Schweiz. Studie im Auftrag des Verbandes 
der Auslandsbanken in der Schweiz (St. Gallen 1975); (thereafter: Meyer, Ausländischen Banken); 
H. Schönle, ‘Zur rechtlichen Stellung ausländischer und ausländisch-beherrschter Banken in 
Deutschland, den USA und der Schweiz’, in: M. Lutter, H. Kollhosser and W. Trusen (ed.), Recht 
und Wirtschaft in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Festschrift für Johannes Bärmann zum 70. Geburtstag, 
(Munich, 1975), pp. 893–920; J.-P. Chapuis, ‘Le statut des banques étrangères en Suisse’, Droit et 
pratique du commerce international, vol. 1, no 1 (1976), pp. 119–38; A. Hirsch, ‘Entry for Foreign 
Banks: The Principle of Reciprocity – The Example of Switzerland’, Issues in Bank Regulation, vol. 8, 
no 1, (1984), pp. 63–6; H. P. Dietzi, ‘Das Gegenrechtserfordernis als Bewilligungsvoraussetzung zum 
Geschäftsbetrieb einer ausländischen bzw. ausländisch beherrschten Bank’, in: R. v. Graffenried (ed.), 
Beiträge zum schweizerischen Bankenrecht (Bern 1987), pp. 71–90; D. Poncet and C. Lombardini, ‘La 
surveillance des banques étrangères et des groupes bancaires internationaux. La perspective suisse’, 
in: C. Dominicé, R. Patry and C. Reymond (ed.), Études de droit international en l›honneur de Pierre 
Lalive (Basel/Frankfurt 1993), pp. 322–33.
7 W. Loepfe, Der Aufstieg des schweizerischen Finanzplatzes in der Nachkriegszeit. 1945 bis 1975, 
(Weinfelden 2011), pp. 197–206; (thereafter: Loepfe, Aufstieg des schweizerischen Finanzplatzes).
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describing the evolution, origins and motivations of the foreign banks that 
set up in Switzerland. The third section – the heart of this article – presents 
the reactions of the Swiss authorities and banking circles to the growing 
establishment of foreign financial institutions, and emphasises the mo-
tivating and restrictive forces in the decision-making process. The final 
section discusses the key findings and assesses the impact of the legislation.
I.
Post-World War II economic expansion was a period of remarkable 
growth for the Swiss financial centre. During this ‘Golden Age’ (1945–
1972), the total assets of Swiss banks increased sixfold in real terms, while 
the Swiss real GDP increased by a multiple of 4.5.8 Although the trend 
of more dynamic growth in the financial services sector applied to most 
OECD countries,9 the expansion of Swiss finance was outstanding, since 
it led, at the end of the 1960s, to the establishment of Switzerland as the 
world’s third most important financial centre behind London and New 
York.10 The success of the Swiss financial centre relied on a combina-
tion of political and economic factors in the aftermath of World War II: 
a strong Swiss franc; free capital and currency circulation; political neu-
trality; infrastructure spared from the destruction of war; low public debt 
and comparatively low inflation; a lenient taxation system; and banking 
secrecy protected under criminal law.11 Those competitive advantages were 
8 H. Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer (ed.), Historical Statistics of Switzerland (Zurich 1996), O.13, H.23.
9 C. R. Schenk, ‘Crisis and Opportunity: The Policy Environment of International Banking in the 
City of London, 1958–1980’, in: Y. Cassis and E. Bussière (ed.), London and Paris as International 
Financial Centres in the Twentieth Century (Oxford 2005), pp. 207–28, 207.
10 M. Iklé, Switzerland: an International Banking and Finance Center (Stroudsburg 1972), p. 
155; Y. Cassis, Capitals of Capital : the Rise and Fall of International Financial Centres, 1780–2009 
(Cambridge 2010), p. 218; (thereafter: Cassis, Capitals of capital).
11 M. Mazbouri, S. Guex and R. Lopez, ‘Finanzplatz Schweiz’, in: P. Halbeisen, M. Müller and B. 
Veyrassat (ed.), Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Schweiz im 20. Jahrhundert (Basel 2012), pp. 467–518, 494; 
(thereafter: Mazbouri, Guex and Lopez, ‘Finanzplatz Schweiz’).
Thibaud Giddey
453
combined with a long tradition and reputation as a refuge for interna-
tional funds. When coupled with the extraordinary growth of the world 
economy, they resulted in a significant inflow of foreign capital. Still, the 
immediate post-World War II period was a turning point for the Swiss 
economy, which attempted to return to the new world order. The Swiss 
diplomatic corps successfully managed to break the isolation and the de-
preciation inherited from the awkward position towards Germany during 
the war. The Washington Agreements (25 May 1946) were important steps 
in the integrative process of Switzerland, and can retrospectively be con-
sidered as a victory for Swiss authorities.12 Following this normalisation of 
trade relations with the Allies, the Swiss financial centre strongly resumed 
its international activities. In 1958, the return of many European curren-
cies to convertibility strengthened the surge of capital towards the Swiss 
financial centre.
12 M. Perrenoud, Banquiers et diplomates suisses (1938–1946) (Lausanne 2011), pp. 427–41.
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Figure 1 - Swiss Banks assets (in millions 1945 constant Swiss francs) 
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Source: Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer, O.13, H.23.
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As for the internal competition amongst Swiss banks, the major banks 
and the ‘other banks’ – a category that mostly consisted of foreign banks 
– were the main beneficiaries of the post-war evolution. Both categories 
showed higher growth rates, in terms of assets, than the cantonal banks 
as well as the savings and local banks. The major banks thus represented 
the spearheads of this ‘golden age’. The growing internationalisation of 
banking transactions was the underlying strength of the development of 
Swiss finance during this period. The share of foreign assets and liabili-
ties in Swiss banks’ balance sheets more than doubled between 1962 and 
1972.13 It is worthwhile to keep in mind that international activity had a 
long tradition in Swiss banking. As early as the 1920s, Switzerland had 
occupied a specific position amongst international financial centres: Swiss 
banks attracted flows of international assets from abroad, which were in 
turn lent abroad again. This role as a ‘turntable’ for international capital 
grew extensively during the 1960s. However, it is only partially reflected 
in the statistical records of the Swiss National Bank. Indeed, a large part of 
the transactions took place in off-balance-sheet custody accounts. Cross-
border wealth management – as a result of the considerable inflows of 
foreign capital – became a prime niche-market for Swiss banks. While the 
amount of capital under management already represented 86 per cent of 
Swiss GDP in 1948, this share amounted to 237 per cent in 1970.14
During those booming years, the inflows of foreign capital were so 
excessive that they incited the Swiss central bankers to take preventive 
measures. Indeed, the monetary authorities dreaded the inflationary effects 
related to the inflows of capital and tried to prevent the international use 
of the Swiss franc as a reserve currency. At first, the Swiss National Bank 
attempted to settle the problem by signing several gentlemen’s agree-
ments with commercial banks. Those agreements included measures such 
13 K. Speck, Strukturwandlungen und Entwicklungstendenzen im Auslandgeschäft der schweizer 
Banken (Zurich 1974), p. 35.
14 Mazbouri, Guex and Lopez, ‘Finanzplatz Schweiz’, p. 477.
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as negative interest rates on foreign deposits and the setting of minimal 
balances and lending limits. Yet these actions proved ineffective, thus the 
central bankers decided to take another step and prepared a draft of an 
amendment to the Swiss National Bank law. The bankers opposed this plan 
and in 1969 the parliament rejected the entire proposal.15
When compared internationally, the growth of the Swiss financial 
sector is also outstanding. Not only was the power and size of the financial 
sector disproportionate to the country’s surface and real economy, but the 
development of an oversized banking industry also increased during the 
post-war period. According to Mazbouri, Guex and Lopez, who compare 
the size of the major Swiss banks with their European counterparts, 
the major Swiss banks had much higher growth rates than the German 
Grossbanken, the largest French deposit banks or the British ‘Big Five’. In 
1970, the assets of Swiss banks reached 60 per cent of British banks, 64 
per cent of French banks and 92 per cent of German banks.16 This trend 
is evident when the assets of the banking sector are expressed as a share 
of national GDP. The following figure (Figure 2) clearly shows the specific 
position of Switzerland compared to other European economies.
In parallel with this formidable growth, the Swiss banking industry 
coped with increasing international criticism directed against it during 
the post-war period. Some of the features and practices of the Swiss banks, 
such as banking secrecy, numbered accounts and related tax evasion, 
were at the heart of international denunciation. Admittedly, interna-
tional tensions related to Swiss banking secrecy already existed during the 
interwar period,17 but grew extensively in the 1960s. In 1956, the English 
labour MP and later Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, accused the ‘Gnomes 
15 P. Bernholz, ‘From 1945 to 1982: the transition from inward exchange controls to money supply 
management under floating exchange rates’, in: W. Abegg (ed.), The Swiss National Bank 1907–2007 
(Zurich 2007), pp. 109–99, 194–5; R. Äppli, et al. (ed.), 75e anniversaire. Banque nationale suisse: les 
années 1957 à 1982 (Zurich 1982), p. 131.
16 Mazbouri, Guex and Lopez, ‘Finanzplatz Schweiz’, pp. 474–6.
17 C. Farquet, ‘The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison’, paper 
for the conference ‘The Sub-prime Crisis and how it Changed the Past’ (Geneva 2011).
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of Zurich’ of speculating against the pound sterling. At the time of the 
creation of the Zurich gold pool by the major Swiss banks in 1968, tensions 
with the City revived. The Zurich gold market soon exceeded the London 
market in the sale of South African gold.18 Preceding this event, the 
American journalist T.R. Fehrenbach published a successful book high-
lighting some of the affairs related to Swiss banking.19 Many world-famous 
newspapers such as the New York Times and the Financial Times became 
interested in Swiss banks and the reasons for their success, thus making a 
broader audience pay attention to those questions. The frequent presence 
of Swiss landscapes as backgrounds in James Bond movies – which were 
systematically linked to financial transactions – was a cultural reflection 
of this evolution and played a part in the popularisation of a stereotypical 
18 S. Bott, ‘La Suisse et l’Afrique du Sud. 1945–1990. Commerce, finance et achats d’or durant 
l’apartheid’, unpublished PhD thesis (Lausanne 2008); Loepfe, Aufstieg des schweizerischen 
Finanzplatzes, pp. 206–28.
19 T.R. Fehrenbach, The Swiss Banks (New York/London/Toronto 1966).
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Figure 2 - Total assets of the banking sector expressed as percentage of the national GDP 
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image of the Swiss banker.20 The Swiss Bankers Association soon realised 
the potential damage of the international critical campaign to the Swiss 
banking reputation: in 1967, it was decided to counter-attack and set up a 
special committee in charge of improving the advertising activity of banks 
abroad.21 This public relations operation was carried out in collaboration 
with the Département politique fédéral – i.e. the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
– which sent a circular to Swiss diplomatic representations in order to 
contribute to ‘a better understanding of our banking practice’.22 This in-
ternational context, marked by a cyclical resurgence of strong criticism of 
Swiss banks, should be taken into account when analysing the reactions of 
the Swiss banking industry to the growing establishment of foreign banks 
in Switzerland.
II.
The competitive advantages of the Swiss financial centre already mentioned, 
as well as very liberal regulation of banking operations, enticed many 
foreign financial institutions into opening a branch or a subsidiary bank 
in Switzerland. Before proceeding, four different kinds of foreign estab-
lishments should be distinguished. Firstly, a foreign bank could simply 
open a representative office, which did not involve the incorporation of a 
company. A representative office was not subject to the banking law and 
thus was not allowed to perform banking operations. Secondly, a foreign 
bank could open a branch, that is, a foreign affiliate that was legally part of 
the company. This kind of foreign establishment had already been under 
20 S. Guex and G. Haver, ‘James Bond contre – ou pour ? – les gnomes de Zurich: L’image de la 
place financière suisse dans la série 007’, in: F. Hache-Bissette, F. Boully and V. Chenille (ed.), James 
Bond (2)007: Anatomie d’un mythe populaire (Paris 2007), pp. 330–8.
21 Archives of the Swiss Bankers Association (thereafter: ASBA), Minutes of the Board of Directors, 
preliminary report, 21 Jun. 1967.
22 Circular from Pierre André Nussbaumer (DPF) to the diplomatic representations, 16 May 1967, 
Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, vol. 24 (1967–1969) (Zurich 2012), doc. 23, dodis.ch/33015.
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special regulation since 1936: the reciprocity requirement was the main 
condition to be met in order to establish a foreign branch.23 The third type 
of establishment was the incorporation of a subsidiary company. These 
were banks with their own legal personality, but whose share capital was 
owned by a single parent company. Lastly, there were also so-called for-
eign-controlled banks, which were legally the same as subsidiaries. The 
difference lay in their corporate name, which did not clearly express their 
foreign nature, and the fact that they were not linked to a single specific 
parent company but could be owned by one or several financial groups. 
Until 1969, both subsidiaries and foreign-controlled banks were legally 
considered Swiss banks, with free entry to the banking sector. Based on 
this, a foreign investor seeking to open a financial company in Switzerland 
had a wide range of choice when it came to these different types of es-
tablishments. There was a form of ‘regulatory arbitrage’, in which foreign 
investors could choose the form of incorporation best suited to their 
needs. As an example: the French Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, active 
in Geneva since 1872 in the form of a branch, decided in 1968 to change 
to a subsidiary.24
As shown in figure 3, the first foreign banks in Switzerland date back 
to the end of the nineteenth century. French banks, such as Banque de 
Paris et des Pays-Bas or Crédit Lyonnais, were part of that movement. 
Their presence in Geneva mainly allowed them to play an active role 
in the export of capital to Switzerland.25 During the inter-war period, a 
dozen foreign banks opened their doors, such as the Geneva branch of 
Lloyds Europe. But the real take-off of foreign banks in Switzerland took 
place after the Second World War: 82 out of 96 foreign banks active in 
23 Decree from the Swiss Federal Banking Commission concerning foreign banks that are active 
in Switzerland, 15 Feb. 1936.
24 E. Bussière (ed.), Paribas 1872–1992: l’Europe et le monde (Antwerp 1992), p. 163.
25 F. Walter, ‘Finance et politique à la belle époque: la France et les emprunts de la Confédération 
helvetique (1890–1914)’, Revue suisse d’histoire, vol. 32, no 3, (1982), pp. 421–50, 432; Y. Cassis, 
‘Le Crédit Lyonnais à Genève, 1876–2001’, in : B. Desjardins, et al. (ed.), Le Crédit Lyonnais (1863–
1986): études historiques (Geneva 2003), pp. 617–29.
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Switzerland in 1972 were set up after 1945; 68 of them were founded after 
1958. Indeed, there was a sharp increase after 1958. One of the key factors 
in this evolution was the restoration of currency convertibility in 1958. In 
terms of numbers: the share of foreign banks relative to the total number 
of institutions rose from four per cent in 1945 to eight per cent in 1958 
and finally to 20 per cent in 1972.26 In terms of balance sheets: the share of 
foreign institutions in the total assets of Swiss banks grew from approxi-
mately three per cent in 1958 to ten per cent in 1968, and ultimately to 11 
per cent in 1972.27 The official records confirm this trend: the assets of the 
category in which the foreign banks were listed (übrige Banken) increased 
tenfold in real terms, between 1956 and 1971.28
26 Meyer, Ausländischen Banken, pp. 94–6.
27 1958 and 1972: author’s calculations based on: Federal Archives (thereafter: FA), E6520(A), 
1983/50, vol. 1, file ‘Ausl. Banken 1959–1974’; 1968: ‘Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée 
fédérale à l’appui d’un projet d’arrêté fédéral urgent instituant le régime du permis pour les banques 
en mains étrangères, du 13 novembre 1968’, in: Feuille fédérale, 1968, vol. 2, no 48, 784.
28 According to Burkhalter, 60 per cent of the assets of this heterogeneous category came from 
foreign-controlled institutions. See Burkhalter, Übrige Banken, p. 59.
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In other words, the Swiss banking sector experienced a massive wave of 
foreign bank establishments from the 1960s onwards. On a global level, this 
growth was part of the ‘second wave of multinational corporate banking’, as 
opposed to the first wave that took place in the nineteenth century with the 
expansion of British overseas banks.29 American commercial banks were 
the main driving force of the second wave, which was related to the birth of 
the Eurodollar market and the rise of offshore centres.30 The expansion of 
foreign banks in Switzerland during the 1960s remained outstanding when 
compared internationally. According to an OECD study, the international-
isation of the Swiss financial centre rapidly increased during the 1960s. In 
1970, Switzerland was a safe haven for 97 foreign banks, a number equiv-
alent to the British total (95), but much higher than in Germany (77), 
France (58) and Belgium (26).31
Throughout the twentieth century, there also was a clear evolution with 
regard to the national origin of the banks established in Switzerland. Until 
the Second World War, foreign financial institutions for the most part 
came from neighbouring countries. French banks in Geneva and Italian 
banks in the Italian-speaking region of Ticino accounted for the bulk of 
foreign banks. During the 1950s, Switzerland faced a strong increase in 
Middle Eastern banks (Israeli, Lebanese and Egyptian). This development, 
speeding up from 1956–1959, is partly linked to the Suez-Crisis, and its 
destabilising effect on the whole region. Finally, during the 1960s, the 
large American commercial banks were the most important newcomers 
to Switzerland. The massive number of American institutions established 
during the period can be explained by various reasons. Some argued that 
providing services to American holding companies in Europe was the 
29 G. Jones (ed.), Banks as multinationals, (London/New York 1990), p. 5. See also K. E. Born, 
Geld und Banken im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart 1977), p. 572.
30 According to Richard Dale, Switzerland hosted in 1970 eleven foreign branches of US banks 
out of a total of 93 European US branches. R. Dale, The Regulation of International Banking, 
(Cambridge 1984), p. 7.
31 R.M. Pecchioli (ed.), The Internationalisation of Banking: the Policy Issues (Paris 1983), p. 72.
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main factor;32 others claimed that Eurodollar investments were the cause 
of it.33 This trend is evident in figure 5, which shows that the share of 
American banks in the total assets of foreign banks in Switzerland grew 
from nine per cent in 1958 to 21 per cent in 1972. Four American banks 
ranked amongst the 15 largest banks in Switzerland in 1969. More surpris-
ingly, three out of the five largest banks came from the Near East and at 
that time had been established less than 20 years.
Another approach to considering the international integration of 
a financial centre consists in comparing the growth of foreign financial 
firms to the international expansion of banks from the host country. In this 
respect, it should be noted that there was, at least up to the 1970s, a certain 
discrepancy between the dynamic growth of foreign banks in Switzerland 
32 Iklé, Switzerland Finance Center, p. 89.
33 A. Matter, ‘Die Auslandsbanken im Schweizerischen Bankensystem‘, (Conference Paper, 1975), 
p. 4.
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and the rather slow expansion of Swiss banks – in terms of branches and 
subsidiaries – at the global level.34 In 1960, there were already 48 foreign 
banks active in Switzerland, while major Swiss banks only had twelve in-
ternational representations. By 1969, those figures had risen to 87 and 
34 See also E.F. Paltzer, ‘Internationalization of Banking by Foreign Bases and Addresses’, in: 
J.E. Wadsworth, J.S.G. Wilson and H. Fournier (ed.), The Development of Financial Institutions in 
Europe, 1956–1976 (Leyden 1977), pp. 167–74, 168.
Table 1 – 15 largest foreign banks in Switzerland in 1969
Rank Name Origin Assets inmillions CHF
Foundation 
Year
1 Lloyds Bank Europe Limited, London* GBR 1360 1919
2 Banque pour le Commerce Suisse-Israélien ISR 1219 1950
3 Banco di Roma per la Svizzera VAT-ITA 1030 1947
4 Discount Bank (Overseas) Ltd ISR 1026 1952
5 Banque pour le Développement commercial LBN 905 1960
6 Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (Suisse) FRA 877 1872
7 Dow Banking Corporation USA 811 1965
8 First National City Bank, New York* USA 733 1963
9 The American Express International Ban-king Corporation, New York* USA 597 1921
10 Lavoro-Bank AG ITA 553 1959
11 Internationale Genossenschaftsbank AG DEU 551 1957
12 Banca del Gottardo ITA 525 1957
13 Arab Bank (Overseas) Ltd JOR 458 1962
14 Overseas Development Bank USA/PAN 449 1961
15 Crédit Lyonnais, Lyon* FRA 435 1876
* : branches of foreign banks
Sources: FA, E6520(A), 1983/50, vol. 1, Ausländische Banken. Origin: ASBA, J.4 
(1967–1969). Foundation Year: SNB, Das schweizerische Bankwesen im Jahre 1971 + 
Meyer, Die Ausländischen Banken, pp. 94-6.
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45.35 This gap is related to some of the specificities of the Swiss financial 
centre during the first part of the twentieth century, which had become a 
major actor in international banking, despite, or thanks to, the absence of 
a network of international branches.36 Interestingly, one of the reasons that 
can explain the relatively small international expansion lies in the fact that 
Swiss bankers feared that their presence abroad could be seen as a disad-
vantage in attracting flight capital. Indeed, foreign customers sometimes 
considered Swiss banks that did not have foreign representations as safer 
institutions.37 Yet, it is noteworthy that the internationalisation of the Swiss 
banks took place with a slight delay. The expansion of the network of inter-
national agencies that started at the end of the 1960s – as shown on Map 1 
– eventually allowed them to close the gap during the 1970s.
Why did foreign banks decide to settle in Switzerland? A major part 
of the answer to that question lies in the very liberal banking regula-
tions.38 Firstly, the 1934 banking law set extremely low barriers to entry: 
a minimum capital requirement, and statutes that specified the sphere of 
activity. As mentioned earlier, the law also included a provision requiring 
that branches of foreign banks could only open if the home country 
granted reciprocity to Swiss banks. However, this restriction only applied to 
branches of foreign banks, and not to subsidiaries. Under these conditions, 
the federal supervisory authority had only very limited powers to prevent a 
bank – Swiss or foreign – from opening.39 Secondly, banking regulations in 
35 Author’s calculations based on Meyer, Ausländischen Banken, pp. 94–6, and the major Swiss 
banks’ annual reports.
36 See Y. Cassis, ‘Swiss international banking, 1890–1950’, in : G. Jones (ed.), Banks as 
Multinationals (London/New York 1990), pp. 160–172; M. Mazbouri and M. Perrenoud, ‘Banques 
suisses et guerres mondiales’, in: V. Groebner, S. Guex and J. Tanner (ed.), Kriegswirtschaft und 
Wirtschaftskriege (Zurich 2008), pp. 233–53.
37 Mazbouri, Guex and Lopez, ‘Finanzplatz Schweiz’, p. 511.
38 On the Swiss supervision system in international perspective : P. Cooke, ‘Some reflections 
arising from comparisons between the Swiss and other banking supervisory systems’, in : U. Zulauf 
(ed.), 50 ans de surveillance fédérale des banques (Zurich 1985), pp. 139–50.
39 T. Giddey, ‘Gendarme ou médecin des banques? Les premières années d’activité de la 
Commission fédérale des banques (1935–1943)’, Traverse. Revue suisse d’histoire, no 3 (2012), pp. 
145–63.
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Switzerland did not impose any separation of commercial and investment 
banking activities. The ability to practice any type of financial activity in a 
safe and discreet environment was certainly an important incentive in the 
choice of Switzerland. Of course, banking secrecy, which was considerably 
strengthened in the 1934 banking law,40 formed a key component in this 
regulatory framework. In addition to these flexible regulations, Switzerland 
also offered a number of generally attractive features: its political stability 
and neutrality; its geographical location; a strong and freely convertible 
currency; low tax regimes; and qualified multilingual staff. Unsurprisingly, 
in a 1972 survey of foreign bank executives, which investigated the reasons 
for the site selection of Switzerland, wealth management business appeared 
as the second most mentioned answer.41 Banking secrecy, the tax environ-
ment, international trade as well as political and monetary stability were 
also among the given reasons.
Two specific examples illustrate the questions regarding the motiva-
tions of foreign banks in opening an agency in Switzerland. In 1957, a 
group of investors from Arab circles were trying to set up a Banque Arabo-
Suisse in Geneva. When discussing this new opening, the governors of the 
Swiss National Bank pointed out that:
‘According to the founders, the planned institution aims to promote 
trade between Switzerland and the Arab states. However, in our view, 
there can be little doubt that the new institution will also be designed, 
in fact probably even primarily, to absorb flight capital from coun-
tries in the Middle East. Given the restless situation in the East and 
the associated risk of international conflict, there is a tendency in the 
40 See S. Guex, ‘The Origins of the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law and Its Repercussions for Swiss 
Federal Policy’, Harvard Business History Review, vol. 74, (2000), pp. 237–66.
41 Meyer, Ausländischen Banken, pp. 12–7. The first reason being the obvious fact the Switzerland 
developed into an international financial centre.
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Arab world to reduce pound and dollar assets and to take refuge in 
the Swiss franc.’42
In this case, Swiss authorities were aware of the hidden purposes con-
cerning the establishment of this institution, which finally opened in 
Geneva under the company name Banque commerciale Arabe in 1958. 
The second example is the Compagnie de Gestion et de Banque, which 
was a subsidiary of the large Belgian bank, Société Générale. In 1956, this 
bank specialising in private wealth management set up in Geneva. More 
precisely, the directors of the Belgian parent company chose to open a sub-
sidiary to resume the activities that had taken place until then in Tangier. 
In 1956, the international and free zone of Tangier was returned to the 
then newly independent Morocco and thereby lost its fiscal and customs 
privileges. With this new situation, the Belgian bank decided to relocate 
its private wealth management business to Geneva.43 Other banks, such 
as the French Banque de l’Indochine, followed the same path. These two 
examples show that there was often a certain discrepancy between the 
publicly touted reasons and the real, hidden motivations. This difference is 
also related to the great diversity of banking operations that foreign insti-
tutions could perform in Switzerland. The foreign institutions often used 
their Swiss agency to practice the type of business they could not perform 
in their country of origin, or that was less profitable there (e.g. wealth man-
agement, participation in bond issuance, international trade financing, 
transactions on custody accounts). Daniel Bodmer, chief secretary of 
the Federal Banking Commission – Switzerland’s banking supervision 
authority, shared this point of view in 1968:
42 FA, E6100(B), 1972/96, vol. 32, letter from Walter Schwegler and Hans Huber (SNB) to the 
Federal Banking Commission (thereafter FBC), 3 Sep. 1957. All quotations are translated from 
German by the author.
43 G. Vanthemsche, ‘La Banque de 1934 à nos jours’, in: H. van der Wee (ed.), La Générale de 
Banque. 1822–1997 (Brussels 1997), pp. 287–526, 365; see also Archives of the Swiss National Bank 
(thereafter: ASNB), Minutes of the Governing Board, 23 Aug. 1956, no 907, p. 1228.
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‘Sometimes [the foreign bankers] quite openly declare that they wish 
to conduct from Switzerland the kind of business which is prohib-
ited by the legislation of their mother country. This is also powered by 
capital flight from countries like Italy, the USA and France. […] There 
are probably more frequently extra-economic motives which make 
Switzerland appear to foreign bank founders as a paradise.’44
As this quotation already suggests, Swiss authorities did not remain 
impassive to the considerable wave of foreign bank establishments. The 
political and regulatory response of Swiss banking circles and authorities 
will be presented in the following section.
III.
In a broad outline, three phases can be distinguished in the attitude of 
Swiss authorities towards the increase of foreign financial institutions. At 
first, between 1956 and 1965, both the Swiss banking representatives and 
the monetary authorities became aware of the potential ‘threat’ represented 
by foreign banks. They initially adopted a set of indirect obstacles that were 
supposed to act as a deterrent. Thus, from the late 1950s onwards, when 
the number of authorisation requests gradually increased, the main actors 
in Swiss banking politics reacted negatively.
Already in 1956, the Swiss Bankers Association – the powerful bank 
interest group – frowned upon the establishment of the French Banque de 
l’Indochine in Lausanne. The bankers put forward four arguments against 
foreign institutions.45 Firstly, they reckoned that the reputation of the Swiss 
financial centre was at stake. It was ‘undesirable and embarrassing for 
Switzerland’ to be considered on the same level as Tangier. Secondly, the 
44 FA, E6520(A), 1983/50, vol. 1, Letter from Daniel Bodmer (FBC) to Martin Ungerer, 11 Nov. 
1968.
45 ASBA, 713, Eidg. Bankenkommission Bankengesetz, Letter from Max Oetterli (SBA) to FBC, 9 
Aug. 1956.
Thibaud Giddey
469
foundation of a wealth management company represented a ‘sensitive and 
direct impairment of the domestic banking sector’. Switzerland was already 
over-banked and an additional competitor was not welcome. Thirdly, they 
remembered the experience of the Second World War, which had shown 
that the presence of foreign banks in Switzerland could increase inter-
national restrictions on the entire bank industry. Lastly, they stigmatised 
the risk of a domino effect, meaning that each new foreign establish-
ment attracted more opening requests. It should be noted that, from the 
beginning, competition issues were central to the animosity towards the 
setting up of foreign banks.
The central bank governing board largely shared those concerns, yet 
pointed to the fact that the Federal Banking Commission, which was in 
charge of granting the authorisations, had no legal means to prevent the 
unwanted foundation of a bank. Moreover, central bankers had another 
cause of concern. Their reaction to the opening of the Banca del Ceresio 
in Lugano in 1958 was eloquent as they ‘expected that the bank would 
primarily deal with the collection and investment of Italian flight capital’.46 
Yet their condemnation of Italian tax evasion was not caused by moral 
scruples, but rather by the monetary consequences related to it. More 
precisely, the central bank feared that the proliferation of foreign banks, 
which were considered to be using Switzerland as ‘a storage station and 
marshalling yard for foreign flight capital’,47 would massively increase the 
inflows of foreign funds, thus generating adverse inflationary effects.
As for the Federal Banking Commission, it also worried about the sub-
stantial increase of requests. The banking supervisors regretted that the 
law did not impose stricter entry requirements for foreign banks. In the 
absence of a sufficient legal basis, they were all but powerless. However, in an 
internal report on the issue, the chief secretary of the Commission, Daniel 
Bodmer, emphasised that the question was very complex. In some cases, 
46 ASNB, Minutes of the Governing Board, 5 Jun. 1958, no 604, pp. 888–93.
47 ASNB, Minutes of the Governing Board, 21 Aug. 1958, no 908, p. 1366.
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he said, there is a tendency to ‘dramatise things’. He added: ‘Unfortunately, 
one cannot get rid of the suspicion that the opposition to foreign new 
foundations also often conceals unacknowledged enviousness’.48
Yet in the late 1950s, Swiss authorities seemed to generally agree that 
the development of foreign institutions posed a threat. On the other hand, 
the question of the measures that should be taken to curb this development 
was unsettled. The banking industry was torn between two conflicting ob-
jectives. On the one hand, the Swiss Bankers Association intended to limit 
entry by tightening the requirements for foreign banks in order to hamper 
their expansion. On the other hand, they wanted to maintain, above all, 
a very liberal regulatory framework and very limited state intervention-
ism. The secretary of the association, Max Oetterli, was well aware of the 
dangers related to a revision of the banking law:
‘In any case, we must not publicly bring up for discussion demands 
that would ultimately lead to a revision of the banking law or the cor-
porate law. Both laws have stood the test of time up to this day. If we 
wanted to revise them only because of a few shortcomings, we would 
run the risk of losing control of such a revision process very quickly. 
We should be aware that the demands that we could at best realise in 
a revision of the banking or company law are meaningless compared 
with the requests that would in all likelihood be made known by other 
parties in any such revision.’49
In other words, launching a regulatory change amounted to a ‘tightrope 
walk’ for the bankers,50 because they would take the risk of opening a 
pandora’s box that could induce unwanted reforms. Some legal modifica-
tions were nevertheless considered: the introduction of registered shares 
with restricted transferability, which would make the buyout of a bank by 
48 FA, E6520(A), 1983/50, vol. 1, file ‘Ausl. Banken 1959–1975’, Report ‘Zur Frage der 
Ueberfremdung des schweizerischen Bankgewerbes’, Daniel Bodmer, undated [1959].
49 ASBA, Minutes of the Board of Directors, 23 Jun. 1965, p. 20.
50 ASBA, Minutes of Expert Committee, 28 Jan. 1966, Max Oetterli, p. 4.
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foreigners more difficult or the setting up of a bank charter system with 
the necessity of acquiring a certificate of good conduct. But each of the 
proposed legal solutions appeared to have more disadvantages than ad-
vantages for the Swiss financial centre.
Therefore, in the first phase (1956–1965), Swiss authorities confined 
themselves to fighting the establishment of foreign banks by devious 
means. This deterrent strategy took different forms; three examples are 
particularly striking. The central bank refused to open so-called sight 
deposit accounts, which were bank accounts at the Swiss National Bank 
used for interbank payment and settlement traffic, for ‘undesirable’ foreign 
banks.51 As another example: the central bankers attempted to hinder the 
establishment of foreign newcomers by suggesting to the federal police 
for foreigners that they adopt a restrictive policy in granting or extending 
the residence permits of certain foreign nationals.52 The third example of 
indirect action is found in the constant foot-dragging tactics that were 
used by the Federal Banking Commission with regard to the authorisa-
tions given to foreign founders.
During this first phase, the manner in which the Swiss authorities dealt 
with the American First National City Bank – at that time, the third largest 
bank worldwide – which wanted to open a branch in Geneva, proves to be 
very enlightening.53 In the discussion within Swiss banking circles, two new 
and problematic dimensions surfaced. Firstly, the Bankers’ Association 
stressed the fact that the establishment of the colossal commercial bank 
in Geneva would give rise to labour poaching, thus increasing the loss 
of qualified staff, and eventually leading to wage inflation.54 Secondly – 
and more importantly – the setting up of an American bank involved the 
51 ASNB, Minutes of the Governing Board, 5 Jun. 1958, no 604, pp. 888–93.
52 ASNB, Minutes of the Governing Board, 6 Sep. 1956, no 942, pp. 1314–1316. The FBC adopted 
the same tactic in their answer to American investors, letter to Franco Cattaneo, 11 Jul. 1966 (FA, 
E6520(A), 1983/50, vol. 2).
53 Cassis, Capitals of capital, p. 208.
54 FA, E6520(A), 1983/50, vol. 1, letter from the SBA to the FBC, 1 Aug. 1962.
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risk that American bank inspectors would examine the Geneva branch. 
Indeed, American regulations allowed the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency to examine overseas branches of national banks.55 Such inspec-
tions represented a threat to Swiss banking secrecy and conflicted with 
Swiss law. Following long negotiations, the branch eventually opened in 
March 1963.56 The same issue resurfaced soon after. In 1965, when the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency set up a new regulation of 
overseas branches that involved the transmission of records to the parent 
company, Swiss diplomats in the USA took action to explain that those 
provisions were incompatible with Swiss law. Internally, the Swiss Bankers 
Association also intervened and sent a circular to American banks in 
Switzerland reminding them that the violation of banking secrecy was a 
criminal offence.57 In 1967, when the Bank of America requested an au-
thorisation to establish a branch, the strategy of Swiss bankers proved 
successful. With the help of Swiss diplomats in the USA, they succeeded in 
obtaining a capitulation from the Comptroller of the Currency, stating that 
they waived their right to demand reports from the Swiss branch of the 
Bank of America.58 The bank association welcomed this success and hoped 
that a precedent had been set so that such a waiver should be required 
systematically. Faced with a potential threat to banking secrecy, Swiss au-
thorities and bankers effectively managed to limit entry conditions for 
American banks, especially by mobilising the diplomatic corps.
During a second phase, between 1965 and 1967, the attitude of Swiss 
authorities towards the establishment of foreign banks changed consider-
ably. Two important events brought about a turning point.
55 R.M. Robertson, The Comptroller and Bank Supervision. A Historical Appraisal (Washington 
1968), p. 181.
56 See also Loepfe, Aufstieg des schweizerischen Finanzplatzes, p. 199.
57 FA, E6520(A), 1983/50, vol. 1, SBA circular n° 3414, 13 Feb. 1966.
58 FA, E6520(A), 1983/50, vol. 1, letter from the DPF to the other departments, 25 Jan. 1967.
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The first significant event was the so-called ‘Muñoz Scandal’.59 As a 
brief explanation, this financial scandal featured a Spanish businessman, 
Julio Muñoz Ramonet, son-in-law of the president of a large Spanish 
bank, who built a financial empire throughout Europe. From 1962 on, 
the Spanish financier was able to take over two middle-sized regional 
Swiss banks, the Banque Genevoise de Crédit et de Commerce and the 
Spar- und Kreditbank, in St. Gallen. Muñoz, who was also known as 
the wealth manager of former Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, had 
managed to ruin both banks, particularly by financing his own real estate 
business. The banks closed their doors in April 1965. Further investiga-
tions showed that the President of the Federal Banking Commission was 
seriously involved in the scandal since he had accepted a lucrative position 
as Muñoz’ financial advisor. The case, which had some repercussions in the 
international press,60 seriously damaged the reputation of Swiss banks and 
political institutions. It was clear that banking supervision had not worked. 
Worse, the highest representative of the bank supervision authority was 
also directly associated with fraudulent acts.
The Muñoz case revived the question of a revision of the banking law. 
It also strengthened the position of those who considered the prolifera-
tion of foreign banks in Switzerland as a threat to the stability of the whole 
banking industry. In this instance, the discrete takeover of Swiss banks by 
a foreign group had resulted in losses for Swiss creditors.
A few months later, another piece of news came as a shock for the 
Swiss financial centre. In March 1966, the Swiss government authorised 
the Wozchod Handelsbank AG to open in Zurich. This institution was a 
company incorporated under Swiss law – i.e. not a branch of a foreign bank 
59 On the Muñoz Scandal: Loepfe, Aufstieg des schweizerischen Finanzplatzes, pp. 183–8; D. 
Froidevaux (ed.), La Suisse dans la constellation des paradis fiscaux (Lausanne/Geneva 2002), pp. 
107–8; T. R. Fehrenbach, The Swiss Banks (New York/London/Toronto 1966), pp. 104–11; N. Faith, 
Safety in Numbers: The Mysterious World of Swiss Banking (London 1982), pp. 190–8.
60 For example: Time Magazine, 11 Jun. 1965; New York Times, 3 Jun. 1965; Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 9 Jun. 1965; Die Zeit, 18 Jun. 1965.
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– whose stock capital was owned by two Soviet banks, the Gosbank (55 
per cent) and the Vneshtorgbank (40 per cent).61 Although Swiss banking 
circles had known for some months of Soviet intentions to establish a 
bank in Switzerland,62 the foundation of the so-called Russenbank still 
caused some anxiety. Yet, since the founders had chosen to open a subsid-
iary instead of a branch – as they had first planned –the Federal Banking 
Commission had no legal basis to refuse the authorisation. After delaying 
its decision for several months, the Federal Council could not evade the 
question any longer and finally granted the authorisation. The secretary 
of the Swiss Bankers Association summarised the considerations of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘the Russians cannot be denied what we have 
to concede to Arabs and other exotic foreigners.’63 The case of the Soviet 
bank amplified the concerns of Swiss bankers for at least two reasons: on 
the one hand it drew international attention to Switzerland and strength-
ened American critics, who believed that Switzerland served as a transfer 
hub for Soviet trade; on the other hand, Swiss bankers feared that Moscow 
would use the Zurich-based company for economic espionage or to obtain 
confidential information. In actual fact, the Wozchod Handelsbank, es-
tablished on the pretext of financing trade between Switzerland and the 
Eastern bloc, was mainly active in the gold market.64
The Muñoz scandal and, to a lesser extent, the Zurich Soviet bank, led 
to a change in attitude on the part of Swiss authorities. Firstly, it resulted 
in the questioning of the role of the banking supervision authority. After 
several parliamentary motions, the Federal Banking Commission drew 
up a preliminary draft revision of the banking law in July 1966. However, 
the Finance Department initiated the legislative process of revision four 
61 R. Husbands, ‘Soviet Banks Abroad: Legal and Economic Perspectives: 1917 to 1990’, 
unpublished PhD thesis (Geneva 1996), 264; (thereafter: Husbands, ‘Soviet banks’).
62 ASNB, Minutes of the Governing Board, 13 May 1965, no 612, 981–2.
63 ASBA, Minutes of the Board of Directors, 8 Dec. 1965, p. 30.
64 Husbands, ‘Soviet banks’, pp. 265–9; Loepfe, Aufstieg des schweizerischen Finanzplatzes, pp. 
201–3.
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years later, with different objectives from those originally proposed by the 
Federal Banking Commission. Secondly, the Swiss Bankers Association 
also reassessed the threats associated with foreign banks. In January 1966, 
leading Swiss bankers defined three major drawbacks: the increase of 
competition that could lead to a bad risk distribution; the advertisement 
abroad of the benefits of banking secrecy, which had a negative impact on 
the international standing of Swiss banks; and the inflow of foreign funds, 
which ran counter to monetary policy.65 As a revision of the banking law 
seemed more and more inevitable, Swiss bankers moved towards a more 
cooperative attitude and decided to collaborate on the process, as long as 
it included some of their priorities. The head of the Basel cantonal bank, 
Ludwig Butscher, expressed this view as follows: ‘I support any measure 
to prevent foreign banks from setting up, unless further state intervention 
is involved. Since this seems obviously impossible, we have to choose here 
between two evils’.66
The third phase of the reaction of Swiss authorities extended from 1968 
until 1969. In March 1969 it led to the promulgation by parliament of a 
federal decree ‘establishing the system of licenses for foreign-controlled 
banks’. Choosing the lesser of two evils, the Swiss Bankers Association 
triggered the legislative impetus. At first, it carried out a comparative 
survey on the regulation of foreign banks in West Germany, Austria 
and the state of New York.67 This study was meant to show what kind of 
measures could be taken in Switzerland, which appeared to have at that 
time the most liberal regulation for foreign banks.68 Secondly, the associa-
tion tried to assess the ‘foreign influence’ over the Swiss banking industry. 
Several well-informed bankers were asked to provide a list of banks that 
65 ASBA, Minutes of the Expert Committee, 28 Jan. 1966, p. 2.
66 ASBA, Minutes of the Expert Committee, 28 Jan. 1966, p. 7.
67 ASBA, J.4.1, Ausländische Bankengesetze Dez. 1960 – 76, Internal report, 10 Jan. 1966.
68 For a more complete view on foreign banks regulations in Europe, see also J. Welch (ed.), The 
Regulation of Banks in the Member States of the EEC (The Hague/Boston/London 1981), section 15 
and 16.
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were under foreign control or presumed as such. Based on these investiga-
tions, a conference was held in May 1968 with representatives of the Swiss 
Bankers Association, the Swiss National Bank, the Finance Department 
and the Federal Banking Commission. The representative of the Federal 
Banking Commission had to admit – quite bitterly – that representatives of 
the banking industry, with the support of the central bank and the finance 
administration, had managed to fundamentally change the agenda of 
a revision of the banking law. Indeed, the shift of priority was obvious. 
Whereas the 1966 draft provided for a general strengthening of supervi-
sory powers concerning all Swiss banks, in 1968 the discussions were only 
about the best way to slow down the establishment of foreign banks.69 In 
October 1968, the small committee favoured the legal option of an urgent 
federal decree. This type of legal order was more flexible and quicker to 
pass than a proper law or law amendment. Furthermore, the number of 
authorisation requests kept increasing. After having to grant six authorisa-
tions in 1967, the banking commission had to concede to seven new bank 
establishments in 1968, while twelve requests were still on hold.70 The su-
pervisory authority was in an uncomfortable position, because it could not 
delay its decision-making long enough for an ordinary legislative process.
The following parliamentary debates were rather hasty; opposition 
was very weak and the few issues were settled within four months. Media 
attention was also insignificant. In March 1969, the federal decree was 
adopted.71 It set up a two-tier regulation system, meaning that entry re-
quirements were higher for foreign-controlled than for Swiss banks. 
Foreign-controlled banks were defined as banks in which the direct or 
indirect foreign participation amounted to more than half of the share 
69 FA, E6520(A), 1983/50, vol. 2, internal note from Hans Manz to Daniel Bodmer (both FBC), 10 
May 1968.
70 ‘Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale à l’appui d’un projet d’arrêté fédéral urgent 
instituant le régime du permis pour les banques en mains étrangères, du 13 novembre 1968’, in : 
Feuille fédérale, 1968, vol. 2, no 48, p. 783.
71 ‘Arrêté fédéral instituant le régime du permis pour les banques en mains étrangères, du 21 
mars 1969’, Feuille fédérale, 1969, vol. 1, no 12, pp. 625–8.
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capital or voting rights. In order to obtain a license, a foreign-controlled 
bank had to meet four additional conditions:
1. The home country should grant reciprocity to Swiss banks.
2. The company name should not suggest any Swiss origin.
3. Inopportune advertisement with the Swiss head office should 
be avoided.
4. The bank had to certify that it would respect Swiss monetary 
policy.
It is noteworthy to point out that the second requirement was directly 
aimed at foreign banks who used their Swiss branch as an international 
advertising claim, praising the virtues of Swiss banking secrecy and 
numbered accounts. Interestingly, Swiss banks sometimes used this kind 
of advertisement themselves, and the Swiss Bankers Association had to 
issue several recommendations to its member banks in order to limit in-
ternational advertisement of banking secrecy.72
During the parliamentary debates, few of these provisions gave rise to 
a debate. In short, mainly three aspects were discussed.
Firstly, the definition of ‘foreign influence’ over a bank was not as 
simple as it might seem at first glance. It was a thorny issue for two reasons. 
On the one hand, the bankers wanted to avoid the introduction of reg-
istered shares with restricted transferability, because this kind of share 
system could hinder stock market operations. On the other hand, setting 
a broad definition of ‘foreign influence’ entailed a risk of revealing the 
foreign character of certain Swiss banks whose capital was scattered.73 A 
solution was found to circumvent this problem: banks were supposed to 
voluntarily disclose to the authorities the presence of foreign domination.
72 For example in 1957 (Circular no. 107, 12 Jul. 1957) and 1967 (Circular no. 3580, 9 Mar. 
1967). ASBA, Minutes of the Governing Board.
73 FA, E6520(A), 1983/50, vol. 5, Minutes of the Federal Banking Commission, 23 Oct. 1968, p. 
169.
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Secondly, the requirement to explicitly mention the foreign character 
in company names raised fears in some sectors of the Swiss economy. 
Representatives of the chemical sector argued that this provision would 
lead to international retaliatory measures against Swiss industries, or even 
worse, that it would inspire foreign legislators and eventually force Swiss 
industries to disclose their foreign interests. This measure was considered 
highly discriminatory and was even compared to a ‘star of David’ that ‘acts 
as a deterrent’.74 Finally, the provision was mitigated to a certain extent in 
so far as a company name should not explicitly reveal its foreign character 
but only refrain from any suggestion of Swiss origin.
Lastly, the constitutionality of the decree was discussed. Some bank 
representatives feared that the constitutional basis, which the decree relied 
upon, would allow the state and the central bank to intervene more deeply 
in the banking sector on another issue that was debated at the same time. 
Indeed, as mentioned above, the issue of the tools of monetary policy to 
curb inflation was discussed in parallel with the decree. In the end, the 
bankers obtained an informal promise from members of parliament, who 
agreed that their approval of the constitutional basis of the foreign banks’ 
decree would not influence the legislative debate concerning the constitu-
tionality of the monetary policy.75
The federal decree on foreign banks was later integrated into ordinary 
law during the 1971 amendment of the banking law. Its short-term impact 
was fairly small. According to the Federal Banking Commission, its effect 
on the number of requests from foreign founders was very limited. Between 
1969 and 1971, the Commission granted 19 new authorisations to foreign 
banks and could refuse only three requests.76 Those three refusals were 
justified by the fact that the country of origin did not grant reciprocity to 
74 ASNB, 1.3/1229, 131.25, letter from Etienne Junod, chairman of the Swiss Society of Chemical 
Industries, to the Swiss National Bank, 10 Dec. 1968.
75 ASNB, Minutes of the Bank Committee, 17 Jan. 1969, 4; FA, E6520(A), 1983/50, vol. 5, Minutes 
of the Federal Banking Commission, 4 Feb. 1969, p. 3.
76 FA, E6520(A), 1983/50, vol. 1, letter from the FBC to the Finance Department, 8 Jun. 1972.
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Swiss banks. In fact, the issue of reciprocity turned out to be the only active 
obstacle to the opening of foreign banks. Yet its impact was mitigated by 
the fact that it was interpreted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a means 
of expansive action, to promote access to new markets for the major Swiss 
banks.77 In the case of Japanese banks, for instance, the three major Swiss 
banks agreed on a common schedule regarding their expansion in Tokyo. 
Negotiations with Japanese representatives were conducted in order to 
obtain an authorisation for all three banks, in exchange for the opening 
of the Bank of Tokyo and Fuji Bank branches in Zurich.78 Another conse-
quence of the foreign banks’ decree was the foundation in 1972 in Zurich 
of the Association of Foreign Banks in Switzerland, which aimed to defend 
the specific interests of these institutions and improve their public visibil-
ity and political influence.
IV.
For the purpose of synthesising, it is noteworthy to recapitulate the various 
reasons that encouraged the Swiss ruling circles to intervene against the 
expansion of foreign banks.
The factors in favour of stronger regulation can be divided into four cat-
egories. Firstly, Swiss authorities considered that the expansion of foreign 
banks threatened the good reputation of Swiss banking. Swiss authori-
ties interpreted events such as the Muñoz scandal as an expression of the 
disrespect of some foreign bankers for the traditions of Swiss banking. 
Therefore, strengthening the regulation of foreign banks was presented 
as an improvement of Swiss depositors’ safety. More importantly, Swiss 
bankers had concerns about international advertisements, which praised 
77 FA, E6520(A), 1983/50, vol. 1, Memorandum of the discussion on reciprocity, 13 Jul. 1970.
78 Loepfe, Aufstieg des schweizerischen Finanzplatzes, pp. 281–3. See also, FA, E 2001 E–01, 
1982/58, vol. 151, letter from Daniel Bodmer (FBC) to the general direction of UBS, 4 Feb. 1972.
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the virtues of Swiss banking secrecy and numbered accounts. Although 
Swiss banks sometimes used this kind of advertisement themselves, they 
feared that a worldwide exposure of those advantages would incite more 
international criticism. In that sense, they favoured regulatory interven-
tion that could be seen internationally as a positive step towards the more 
cooperative attitude of Switzerland. Regardless of the suspicious transac-
tions linked to organised crime or dictators’ funds per se, Swiss authorities 
mostly worried about the deterioration of Switzerland’s image as a financial 
centre.
Secondly, Swiss bankers were well aware of the fact that foreign banks 
increased competition within the Swiss financial market. As an example: 
some foreign banks participated in the issuance of bonds outside of the 
so-called ‘major banks’ cartel’.79 A few also offered higher interest rates and 
did not always respect the cartel agreements issued by the Swiss Bankers 
Association. Moreover, in the context of staff shortage, foreign banks were 
accused of labour poaching, resulting in a general wage increase.
Thirdly, the Swiss National Bank felt that an expansion of foreign banks 
reinforced the increasing inflow of foreign capital and the international 
use of the Swiss franc, and therefore contributed to an inflationary trend.
Lastly, the Swiss supervisory authorities and banking representatives 
feared that the establishment of a growing number of foreign institutions 
could become a threat to banking secrecy. Indeed, foreign supervisory au-
thorities would increasingly enquire about the activities of their fellow 
citizens in Switzerland, and even try to conduct supervisory operations, 
thus creating a potential loophole in the unassailable banking secrecy.
By and large, the 1969 federal decree on foreign banks was the outcome 
of those concerns. As mentioned above, it turned out to be rather ineffec-
tive. The reciprocity clause was the only hindrance in preventing a foreign 
79 This group formed by the biggest commercial banks and the cantonal banks (the public 
institutions controlled by the various Swiss cantons) in 1911 agreed on a monopolistic collaboration 
on the issuance of loans.
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institution from opening a bank in Switzerland. In conclusion, the passing 
of the 1969 decree met the needs of Swiss banking interests in four ways:
First of all, it was an attempt to quickly limit the expansion of new com-
petitors – a competition that was particularly fierce in the area of wealth 
management  –   without necessarily questioning the very liberal regu-
latory framework. Moreover, by focusing on the issue of foreign banks, 
between 1966 and 1971, the Swiss Bankers Association managed to change 
the agenda concerning the amendment of the banking law. The question 
of the limitation of foreign banks played an important role in the delay 
in the revision process of the law. In this regard, foreign financial insti-
tutions played the role of scapegoat, and were accused of practices that 
were also common for Swiss banks. Furthermore, at the international level, 
the decree can be considered as an effort to silence international criticism 
directed against the Swiss banking haven, by imposing slightly higher entry 
conditions for foreign banks. The requirement that limited advertising for 
foreign banks is very eloquent in this respect. Finally, the reciprocity clause 
included in the decree was used simultaneously as a protectionist measure 
to prevent the establishment of new competitors and as a diplomatic tool 
for the expansion of major Swiss banks. In fact, the expansion of the inter-
national network of Swiss banks took place mainly in the 1970s.
Some scholars have argued that regulated industries can have two 
possible interests: either they might favour strict supervision to create 
barriers for entry, or they might use their political influence to press 
for a lax supervisory system.80 The 1969 regulation of foreign banks in 
Switzerland has shown that a domestic industry can have its cake and eat 
it too: Swiss bankers managed to set higher entry requirements for foreign 
competitors and at the same time maintained a very liberal and lax regu-
latory framework.
80 F. Heinemann and M. Schüler, ‘A Stiglerian view on banking supervision’, Public Choice, vol. 
121, (2004), pp. 99–130.
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